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This article provides an overview of the recent literature on franchising, with special attention 
to  management  control  issues.  Based  on  an  analysis  of  franchising  articles  published  in 
twenty-five high-impact journals over the period 1996–2008, the literature is divided into the 
following three broad streams: franchise initiation and subsequent propensity to franchise, 
franchise performance and control of franchising relationships. Several research gaps and 
avenues  for  future  research  are  identified,  especially  towards  a  systematic  study  of 
management control issues in the context of franchising relationships.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article provides an overview of the recent management literature on franchising, with 
special attention to its management control
i aspects. Franchising plays a prominent role in 
business life today. This form of entrepreneurship is increasingly being adopted in a variety of 
sectors,  especially  by  retailing  and  service  companies  such  as  McDonald’s,  Holiday  Inn, 
Body Shop and Benetton. According to the Deontological European Code of Honour (2004), 
franchising  is  a  system  for  the  sale  of  commodities,  services  and/or  the  application  of 
technology. It is based on a close and continuing cooperation between juridical independent 
and financially autonomous companies, namely the franchisor and his individual franchisees. 
Hereby, the franchisor grants his franchisees the right and he puts them under the obligation 
to exploit a business in accordance with the business concept. Therefore, the franchisee pays 
the franchisor an initial franchising fee, periodical royalties and/or advertising fees. In return, 
the franchisee is granted the right to make use of the brand name, the trademark, the know-
how, the commercial and technical methods, the operating procedures and other industrial or 
intellectual property rights. Moreover, the franchisee is supported by the enduring commercial 
and technical assistance from the part of the franchisor. This all happens during the term of a 
written franchising contract that is concluded for this purpose between the two parties.  
 
A franchising chain is not solely composed of the franchisor and his individual franchisees. 
Figure 1 depicts the complete franchising system, including the franchisor, the single-unit 
franchisees, the multi-unit franchisees with their outlet managers, the master franchisees with 
their sub-franchisees and the managers of company-owned outlets. Most franchising chains 
adopt a dual distribution strategy, also referred to as the plural form, meaning that the chain is 
made up of both franchised and company-owned units (see Srinivasan (2006)). Among the 
franchisees, a distinction can be made between single-unit and multi-unit franchisees. Multi-
unit franchisees own more than one unit and only franchisees that excel in their activities are 
granted the possibility of unit growth (see Bradach (1997)). Other possible members of the 
bounded  franchising  network  are  the  master  franchisees.  When  franchisors  expand  their 
business  in  other  countries,  they  can  assign  a  master  franchisee  who  signs  franchise 
agreements on their behalf with sub-franchisees in a specified territory. Master franchisees 
receive the responsibility to select other franchisees, to offer training, to coordinate activities 
with local franchisees, to monitor performance and to implement the franchisor’s strategies 
(see Shane (1998b)).  
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
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This paper is not the first one to offer an overview of the franchising literature. Elango and 
Fried (1997) review the franchising literature published before 1997 and distinguish three 
broad streams: franchising and society, the creation of the franchising relationship and the 
operation of a franchising system. One of their observations is the lack of attention to the 
manner in which franchising systems actually work to create value. They therefore call for 
research  focusing  on  implementation  issues,  including  the  study  of  management  control 
systems. Combs et al. (2004) review the empirical literature based on three key franchising 
constructs  –  franchise  initiation,  the  subsequent  propensity  to  franchise  and  franchise 
performance  –  from  the  perspectives  of  the  resource  scarcity  theory  and  agency  theory. 
Again, this paper hardly pays attention to the actual management of the relationships within a 
franchising  chain.  Although  management  control  of  inter-organisational  relationships  is 
extremely important, it has not yet been examined systematically in the franchising context 
(see Van der Meer - Kooistra and Vosselman (2006)). Our aim is therefore to provide an 
updated  review  of  the  franchising  literature  published  in  high-impact  journals,  which  we 
analyse in terms of the management control issues. We also identify several research gaps and 
avenues for future research, especially towards a systematic study of the management control 
system in the context of franchising relationships.  
 
We thoroughly searched the business and economics literature on franchising covering the 
time period 1996-2008 by  means of the search engine Web of Science
ii.  Publications in 
journals with an impact factor larger than 1.000 were retained for further analysis. We also 
added 13 articles published in Journal of Small Business Management. Although the impact 
factor of this journal decreased in 2007 and became smaller than 1.000, leaving out this large 
number of articles would make the overview less representative for the franchising literature.  
The final selection contains eighty-six papers published in twenty-five high-impact journals
iii. 
Consequently, if business journals with an impact factor above 1.000 do not occur in this 
selection, it means that they have been screened for franchising articles without result. Similar 
to Combs et al. (2004), we classify the articles along the themes franchise initiation and 
subsequent propensity to franchise on the one hand, and franchise performance on the other 
hand. Additionally however, we include control of franchising relationships as an important 
and separate third theme. The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, 
we discuss the literature on franchise initiation and subsequent propensity to franchise. Next, 
the papers on franchise performance are dealt with. In the fourth section, the literature on 
control  problems  and  mechanisms  in  the  context  of  franchising  relationships  is  outlined. 
Finally, we identify several research gaps and future research opportunities towards gaining a 
more profound understanding of the functioning of management control systems within the 
franchising context.   5 
II. FRANCHISE INITIATION AND SUBSEQUENT PROPENSITY TO FRANCHISE 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the literature on the decision to franchise. Panel A deals with 
the determinants of the extent of franchising. Five articles examine the franchisor’s decision 
to franchise. Based on Michael (1996), Alon (2001) and Combs and Ketchen (2003), we 
know that high levels of business risk, human capital, firm growth rate and investment level 
have a negative impact on the share of sales through franchising and that size (outlet and 
system size), geographical scope, local managerial expertise and franchisor inputs have a 
positive impact. The importance of gender issues (see Dant et al. (1996)) and the type of 
franchising (social venture versus business format franchising) (see Tracey and Jarvis (2007)) 
have been studied more sporadically. The franchisee’s decision to franchise has gained far 
less attention in the recent franchising literature. Factors having a positive impact on the 
franchisee’s decision to franchise include industry risk, financial capital available at start-up, 
education level, salaried work experience (see Williams (1998)), perceived benefits of self-
employment, importance attached to the financial and business benefits of franchising and 
greater choice of sectors (see Kaufmann (1999)). Prior experience as a business owner is 
found  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  decision  to  become  a  franchisee  (see  Williams 
(1998)). Finally, Stanworth and Curran (1999) use a sociological approach for developing a 
theoretical model of franchising. Propositions are formulated with regard to franchising at a 
societal, organisational and individual level, containing factors that influence the franchisor’s 
and franchisee’s decisions to franchise. 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
From  Panel  B,  we  learn  that  the  factors  influencing  franchisors  to  enter  into  multi-unit 
franchising  include  system  growth  rate  (see  Kaufmann  and  Dant  (1996)),  agency  cost 
minimization, system-wide uniformity, brand value, system reward strategies that involve the 
granting  of  additional  units,  subsystem  unit  proximity  and  intra-system  competition  (see 
Weaven and Frazer (2007)). Moreover, multi-unit franchising can have an interesting control 
function for the franchisor. Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) find that chain incentives and 
efficiency issues drive the ownership allocation decisions in these chains: franchisors allow 
their  multi-unit  franchisees  to  own  units  that  are  close  to  one  another  and  they  favour 
franchisees with relevant experience in markets with similar demographic characteristics to 
become  multi-unit  owners.  Finally,  Grünhagen  and  Mittelstaedt  (2005)  investigate  the 
motivation  to  enter  multi-unit  franchising  from  the  perspective  of  different  types  of 
franchisees. They find that multi-unit franchisees operating as area developers and sequential   6 
multi-unit  operators  are  equally  investment-oriented  but  that  the  sequential  multi-unit 
operators are more likely to seek fulfillment of entrepreneurial goals
iv. 
 
From Panel C we conclude that all papers on the plural form are written from the perspective 
of  the  franchisor  and  that  agency  theory  and  resource  scarcity  theory  are  the  dominant 
theories  used  in  explaining  the  plural  form.  Agency  theory  emphasizes  that  managers  of 
company-owned outlets tend to shirk because their income is fixed (see Brickley and Dark 
(1987)), while franchisees possess high-powered incentives as their variable income depends 
on their unit’s performance (see Bürkle and Posselt (2008)). Consequently, the agency view 
assumes that the costs of risk and controlling franchised units explain the varying fraction of 
franchised and company-owned outlets (see Bürkle and Posselt (2008)). The resource scarcity 
view assumes that small chains adopt franchising to gain quick access to resources in order to 
grow fast. However, once the franchisor has acquired sufficient resources over time, he will 
take over his franchisees’ units to obtain tight control (see Carney and Gedajlovic (1991)). 
This reasoning leads to the ownership redirection hypothesis, which states that a franchising 
chain will ultimately become 100% company-owned, because the more powerful franchisor 
will convert previously franchisee-owned outlets to company-owned outlets over time when 
his resource constraints disappear (see Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968)). Empirical studies of the 
ownership redirection hypothesis, however, come to inconsistent conclusions. The diverging 
operationalization of the ownership redirection concept is indicated as the major reason for 
the discrepancies (see Dant et al. (1996)).  
 
Factors found to have a negative impact on the degree of franchised units include franchisor 
size (see Castrogiovanni et al. (2006a), Dant et al. (2008)), royalty rates (see Shane (1998a)), 
access to resources (see Dant and Kaufmann (2003)), specific knowledge of the firm (see 
Combs and Ketchen (1999)) and contractibility of local assets (see Windsperger and Dant 
(2006)). Incidence of internationalization, cash liquidity requirements imposed by the system 
on the franchisees, capital scarcity, and asset specificity are found to have a positive impact 
on the proportion of franchised units (see Combs and Ketchen (1999), Dant et al. (2008)). 
With respect to the level of initial investment and age of the chain, we find some inconsistent 
conclusions across the different studies. According to Shane (1998a), the initial investment 
necessary to open an outlet has a negative impact on the proportion franchised, while Dant et 
al. (2008) find a positive effect. Similarly, some papers (see Castrogiovanni et al. (2006a and 
2006b)) find a positive effect of firm age, while others (see Dant and Kaufmann (2003), Dant 
et al. (2008)) find a negative impact of firm age on the degree of franchised units within a 
chain. In addition, Shane (1998a) provides evidence that the effects of system size, system rate of 
growth and geographic dispersion on the proportion of outlets franchised are curvilinear, which   7 
may reconcile some of the conflicting findings on the direction of these variables. Examining 
other non-linear relationships appears to be an important direction to advance the research on the 
plural form in franchising. 
 
Panel D provides an overview of papers that deal with the franchisor’s decision to franchise in 
the  context  of  an  internationalization  strategy.  Two  papers  examine  the  capabilities  of 
international  franchisors.  International  franchisors  appear  to  have  developed  a  greater 
capability  to  bond  against  and  to  monitor  potential  franchisee  opportunism  (see  Shane 
(1996b)).  However,  the  ability  to  develop  the  specific  set  of  required  capabilities  of 
international  franchisors  appears  to  shift  both  back  and  forward  over  time  in  a  dynamic 
process (see Fladmoe-Lindquist (1996)). Three papers deal with the choice of organisational 
mode for international interfirm collaborations (i.e. franchising versus other modes such as 
equity  joint  ventures  and  management  service  contracts).  Factors  influencing  this  choice 
include host country environment, firm strategy (see Contractor and Kundu (1998), Dunning 
et  al.  (2007)),  the  availability  of  a  support  infrastructure  and  the  possibility  to  imitate 
capabilities (see Erramilli et al. (2002)). Finally, Welsh et al. (2006) provide an overview of 
the  extant  literature  on  international  retail  franchising  and  a  conceptual  model  of  the 
stakeholders of international retail franchising.  
 
III. FRANCHISE PERFORMANCE 
 
In table 2 we divide the extant research on franchise performance into three sub-themes, 
namely  ‘growth  and  survival’,  ‘learning  and  entrepreneurship’,  and  ‘fit  with  strategy  and 
effect on performance’.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
More than half of the papers on performance deal with growth and survival (Panel A). Shane 
(1996a)  argues  that franchising,  as  compared  to  other  hybrid  organisational forms,  has  a 
positive effect on network growth and survival since it overcomes managerial limits to firm 
growth. However, Lafontaine and Shaw (1998) conclude that the growth rate of business 
format franchising is at best commensurate with the growth rate of the economy as a whole. 
Factors  with  a  positive  impact  on  franchise  system  growth  include  franchisor  growth 
orientation, franchisee  start-up  costs  (see  Castrogiovanni and Justis  (2002)), multi-partner 
franchise  system  start-ups,  franchise  system  piloting,  prior  franchising  experience  of  the 
franchisor (see Stanworth et al. (2004)), lowering of royalty rates as the system ages, low up-
front franchise fees rising over time, low initial investment, financing of franchisees (see 
Shane et al. (2006)) and close adherence to the original franchise practice (see Szulanski and   8 
Jensen (2006)). Industry growth, franchisor age (see Castrogiovanni and Justis (2002)) and 
adaptation by the subsidiary that removes the diagnostic value of the original franchising 
practice (see Szulanski and Jensen (2006)) produce a negative effect for network growth. 
Grünhagen  and  Dorsch  (2003)  investigate  how  franchisees’  perceptions  about  their 
franchisor’s value are related to the franchisees’ decision to expand their franchise operations. 
The  results  show  that  franchisees  recalling  an  earlier  expansion  decision  have  stronger 
positive  perceptions  about  their  franchisor’s  value  than  franchisees  contemplating  an 
expansion of their operations.  
 
Four  papers  in  Panel  A  deal  with  survival  of  the  franchise  system  as  a  whole.  Passive 
ownership by the franchisee, franchisee cash investment, franchisee experience, geographic 
concentration of the system (see Shane (1998b)), legitimacy of the franchise system (i.e the 
degree to which an organisation's activities are taken for granted and/or the extent to which a 
new form conforms to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards), efficiency of 
the  franchise  system  (see Shane  and  Foo  (1999)),  contracting  efficiency  and  adoption  of 
exclusive territories by new franchise chains (see Azoulay and Shane (2001)) have positive 
effects on the survival of new franchising chains, whereas complexity of the franchise system 
and master franchising (see Shane (1998b)) have negative effects. Shane (2001) finds that 
large firms that adopt policies which screen agents, signal quality and control agent’s free-
riding behaviour are more likely to survive and that changes in system size require changes in 
franchisor policies to ensure survival.  
 
Finally, the rest of the papers in Panel A look at survival and failure of business units in a 
franchising chain. Bates (1998) examines the survival patterns among franchise and non-
franchise  small  firms  and  concludes  that  the  purchase  of  a  franchise  by  a  newcomer  is 
unlikely to reduce the risks facing a new business start-up. One of the main reasons is that 
newcomers have to compete with many newly-opened units in mature franchising niches 
owned by multi-unit franchisees with greater experience and resources.  Kalnins and Mayer 
(2004)  provide  an  overview  of  the  importance  of  local  and  distant  experience  of  the 
franchisor and the owner at the time of the unit's founding on the unit’s survival. Falbe and 
Welsh (1998) analyse franchise executives' perceptions of the importance of a number of 
characteristics associated with franchisee success and failure and find significant differences 
in the perceptions based on the country location of the franchisor and on the percentage of 
franchisee-owned units in the chain. 
 
Panel B provides an overview of franchising papers on learning and entrepreneurship. Two 
papers  deal  with  learning.  Ingram  and  Baum  (1997)  find  evidence  that  franchisors  are   9 
superior  learners  and  that  franchisees  do  not  enjoy  a  benefit  from  their  experience  with 
franchised units. Sorenson and Sørensen (2001) conclude that company-owned and franchised 
units complement each other because they provide different types of organisational learning: 
managers of company-owned outlets exploit more, while franchisees explore more. The other 
three papers in Panel B deal with entrepreneurship. Kaufmann and Dant (1998) provide a 
theoretical model on entrepreneurship in franchising and conclude that franchising provides a 
unique and fertile setting for research in entrepreneurship. Since then only two empirical 
papers  have  been  published  on  this  topic.  Falbe  et  al.  (1998)  find  that  franchisor  size, 
franchisor  age,  franchisor  growth  and  time  in  franchising  (i.e.  the  time  between  the 
establishment of the company and the establishment of a franchising system) have an impact 
on the entrepreneurial strategies and innovation efforts of franchisors and their support of 
entrepreneurial activities by franchisees. Clarkin and Rosa (2005) conclude that cooperative 
and  adaptable  relationships  between  franchisors  and  franchisees  allow  room  for 
entrepreneurial  activity  by  franchisees  with  a  positive  effect  on  performance,  but  that 
restrictive systems are likely to perform less well. 
 
Panel C contains nine papers that explore the fit with strategy and the subsequent effect on 
performance. Four papers deal with performance effects of franchisors’ strategies. Hoffman 
and  Preble  (2003)  investigate  franchisors’  inclination  to  follow  a  conversion  franchising 
strategy, which is a strategy where new franchisees are added to a franchised system by 
recruiting existing independent entrepreneurs or competitors’ franchisees. They conclude that 
conversion franchising may offer economic resources and skills, which may serve as sources 
of competitive advantage. A franchising strategy may also lead to a first-mover advantage 
through the pre-emption of valuable real estate and desirable mind space of customers (see 
Michael (2003)). Combs et al. (2004) identify different types of franchisors and conclude that 
the  group  that  has  the  strategy  to  franchise  because  of  resource  scarcity  exhibits  poorer 
performance than other types of franchisors. Srinivasan (2006) investigates the effect of a 
dual distribution strategy on intangible firm value and finds that this effect can be positive or 
negative depending on combinations of several firm characteristics such as age, scope of 
vertical integration, advertising, financial leverage and financial liquidity. 
 
Four  papers  research  the  link  between  franchisees’  strategies  and  performance.  Litz  and 
Stewart  (1998)  compare  small  businesses’  strategy  to  compete  as  a  franchisee  or  as  an 
independent retailer. They conclude that franchising adds value to a small business and that 
the performance impact may not be due to cost advantages, but rather comes from the use of 
the trade name as a market signal to potential customers. Michael (1999a) concludes that 
franchising  also  provides  an  instrument  for  product  differentiation  for  entrepreneur-  10 
franchisees and Achrol and Etzel (2003) find evidence that franchisees in different types of 
markets should adapt their goals in order to gain a better performance. Finally, Yin and Zajac 
(2004) find that franchised stores with their more decentralized structures are more likely to 
pursue  strategies  that  emphasize  flexibility,  whereas  company-owned  stores  tend  to 
emphasize predictability. Furthermore, they show that this strategy-structure fit leads to better 
performance.  The  last  paper  in  Panel  C,  Baucus  et  al.  (1996),  analyses  how  consensus 
between franchisors and franchisees on means for product and brand development relates 
positively to the franchise system's competitive advantage. They conclude that consensus on 
the means of pursuing efficiency exhibits a positive relationship with business performance 
and franchisees' satisfaction. 
 
IV. CONTROL OF FRANCHISING RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Control problems are inherent in franchising networks. While the large majority of the papers 
in this review hint at these problems when discussing other aspects of franchising, twenty-
eight papers – about 33% of the selected papers – more thoroughly examine control issues. 
We list them in Table 3, in which the Panels A, B and C focus on control problem and the 
Panels D, E and F focus on control mechanisms.  
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
Five papers study the tension between control and autonomy in a franchising chain (Panel A). 
Chains often use a dual distribution strategy to maintain uniformity and  at the same time to 
achieve system-wide adaptation to changing markets:  company-arrangements appear to  be 
better for controlling units, while  franchise arrangements tend to generate more innovations 
(see Bradach (1997)). Bradach (1997) concludes that each type of unit benefits from the other 
because of mutual learning and ratcheting processes. Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) emphasise 
that  finding  the  balance  between  standardization  and  permitting  local  market  adaptation 
remains  one  of  the  greatest  challenges  facing  franchisors.  However,  by  conceptualizing 
control and autonomy as multidimensional concepts, they can be considered as complements 
rather than opposites (see Pizanti and Lerner (2003)). Another interesting finding is that U.S. 
franchisors feel a greater demand for autonomy by their experienced domestic franchisees 
than  by  their  experienced  international  franchisees.  At  the  same  time,  international 
franchisees  generally  have  more  autonomy  than  domestic  franchisees,  for  example  with 
regard to decisions involving local market adaptation. On the other hand, when the local 
competition  level  is  so  high  that  it  forms  a  threat  to  business  survival,  international 
franchisors  and  franchisees  seek  more  collaboration  (see  Paik  and  Choi  (2007)).  Finally,   11 
Spinelli and Birley (1996) develop a theory of conflict for franchising chains. They recognize 
that the tension in the inter-organisational relationship between franchisors and franchisees 
requires a system of controls that allows coordination as well as adaptation. Related control 
problems are free-riding and opportunism within the chain, which can be caused both by 
franchisors and franchisees (Panel B). Cooperative interaction and formalization are found to 
be useful control structures to alleviate opportunism caused by the franchisor (see Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard (1999)). Encroachment – meaning that franchisors add new units of their brands 
proximately to their franchisees’ existing units – is an important example of franchisor free-
riding  behaviour  (see  Kalnins  (2004)).  Free-riding  from  the  side  of  the  franchisees  on 
franchisor brand reputation can be curbed by increased formalization, decentralized decision-
making, interactions between franchisor representatives and franchisee dealers and external 
competition (see Kidwell et al. (2007)). Other studies focus on control problems related to the 
marketing  mix  (Panel  C):  they  point  at  problems  with  coordinating  the  elements  of  the 
marketing mix (see Michael (2002)), price dispersion within chains (see Lafontaine (1999)), 
and levels of advertising (see Michael (1999b)).   
 
Table  3  further  lists  the  papers  studying  control  mechanisms:  ten  papers  deal  with  the 
franchising contract and formalization (Panel D), two with the structure of a chain (Panel E) 
and five papers focus on informal control mechanisms (Panel F). Seven papers in Panel D 
research contract provisions. Each paper focuses on a different aspect of contracting. Findings 
are  that  more  relational  contracts  are  likely  to  include  various  dispute  resolutions  (see 
Leblebici and Shalley (1996)), that a lump sum versus a sales-based advertising fee can be 
preferred to improve channel coordination under various chain situations (see Desai (1997)), 
and that restrictions on passive ownership, area development plans and mandatory advertising 
expenditures are complementary incentive mechanisms (see Brickley (1999)). Some studies 
investigate royalty rates and initial franchise fees: in a U.S. context, these can be explained by 
across-firm  differences  (see  Lafontaine  and  Shaw  (1999))  and  institutional  factors  (see 
Brickley (2002)). Brickley et al. (2006) find that the franchisee’s physical and human capital 
investments and the franchisor’s experience are positively related to contract duration. Cochet 
and Garg (2008) conclude that firms learn over time and from the experience of peers in their 
sector in designing optimal contract terms. Further, franchising contracts have been presented 
as  illustrations  of  the  systematic  development  of  mini-hostages:  these  are  used  as  an 
alternative for other forms of government to assure that the contracting party will not cheat 
(see  Dnes  (2003)).  Finally,  Nault  (1997)  illustrates  how  information  technology  as  a 
formalized  system  can  provide  the  appropriate  incentives  to  key  actors  within  franchise 
arrangements.  
   12 
Panel E of Table 3 presents two papers discussing the organisational structure of a chain as a 
control  mechanism.  With  Wu  (1998)  we  come  back  to  the  marketing  mix  problems 
mentioned above: price differentials between franchised and independent motels depend on 
the initial franchise fee and the presence of repeat customers. Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) 
examine the targeted rate of company-ownership as a control mechanism. They conclude that 
franchisors with high brand name value have high rates of company-ownership because they 
want to exert more control and protect their brands from franchisee free-riding. These issues 
bring us back to the crucial control functions of the plural form and multi-unit franchising, 
already mentioned in Table 1 in the context of the decision to franchise. Bradach (1997) finds 
that in spite of the differing control strategies of franchised and company-owned units, they 
share several performance measures. These can cause a ratcheting effect enhancing the ability 
to manage the performance of both kinds of units: the high performance of each one sets a 
benchmark or performance standard for the other one to pursue and puts pressure on the other 
one. Similarly, the players within the chain can use detailed information about the company-
owned units to persuade franchisees to change certain behaviour. Michael (2000) finds that 
franchisors can make investments in activities such as dual distribution that increase their 
bargaining  power  and  the  franchisees’  compliance  with  franchisor  standards.  Multi-unit 
franchising has an interesting control function too. Chain incentives and efficiency issues 
drive the ownership allocation decisions in these chains: franchisors allow their multi-unit 
franchisees to own units that are close to one another and franchisees with relevant experience 
in markets with similar demographic characteristics are favoured to become multi-unit owners 
(see Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004)). Further, a chain’s challenge of maintaining uniformity is 
easier in the presence of multi-unit franchisees. They replicate the policies and practices of 
company-owned  units,  from  the  spans  of  control  of  field  personnel  to  the  performance 
evaluation and compensation systems. Moreover, only franchisees that excel in their activities 
are granted the possibility of unit growth. As multi-unit franchisees adopt the policies and 
practices of company units, they help to maintain the uniformity among the chain. Since 
multi-unit franchisees internalize the chain’s standards, they make the chain’s control exercise 
less complex (see Bradach (1997)). In addition, multi-unit franchising serves as a control 
mechanism  that  minimizes  expected  agency  costs  associated  with  the  screening  and 
recruitment of external franchisees (see Weaven and Frazer (2007)).  
 
Six papers from our selection deal with informal control mechanisms (Panel F). The weaker 
the  agents’  incentives  are  aligned  with  the  interests  of  the  network,  the  more  relational 
governance becomes important. Multi-unit franchising and franchisee success decrease the 
need for relational control, while competition increases this need (see Cochet et al. (2008)). 
The informal control mechanisms discussed in the literature include the informal dynamics   13 
between  the  franchisor  and  the  franchisee,  the  franchisee’s  willingness  to  provide 
information, the franchisee’s attitude towards business, the franchisee’s identification and the 
franchisor’s bargaining power. Phan et al. (1996) argue that franchisors are continually trying 
to persuade their franchisees as it is impossible to specify all future actions in contractual 
terms.  The  willingness  of  franchisees  in  distant  markets  to  provide  information  to  their 
franchisors  increases  with  the  extent  of  competition  and  decreases  with  the  age  of  the 
relationship  (see  Dant  and  Nasr  (1998)).  Jambulingam  and  Nevin  (1999)  find  that  the 
franchisee’s attitude towards business can be used as an effective input control strategy by 
franchisors. Ullrich et al. (2007) argue that organisational identification predicted customer-
oriented behaviour on the franchisee level, whereas corporate identification predicted attitude 
toward corporate citizenship behaviour. Finally, Michael (2000) finds that dual distribution, 
selecting inexperienced franchisees, granting exclusive territories and employing a long term 
training program increase the franchisor’s bargaining power.   
 
V. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this section, we continue our analysis in order to specify a number of research gaps and 
future research opportunities. Table 4 summarizes the main findings and conclusions drawn 
from the recent academic literature on franchising. It is clear that a lot of research attention 
has been devoted to examining in depth the factors influencing the decision to franchise and 
the  performance  of  the  franchise  system.  On  the  other  hand,  33%  of  the  papers  under 
investigation deal with control aspects. The control stream appears to lead more fragmented 
conclusions, in the sense that diverging control aspects and determining factors have been 
studied  in  separate  articles  so  far.  None  of  these  articles  study  the  integral  management 
control system within a chain.  
 
[insert Table 4 here] 
 
Overall, we observe that the franchising literature has so far paid extensive attention to the 
franchisor’s  perspective,  while  the  franchisee’s  perspective  has  come  in  the  picture 
considerable less often. The research stream on franchise initiation and subsequent propensity 
to  franchise  provides  only  a  limited  number  of  papers  focusing  on  the  franchisee’s  as 
compared to the franchisor’s view. However, as an important and legally independent party in 
the franchising agreement, the franchisee’s perspective is highly relevant with respect to this 
topic. In the research stream on franchise performance, it strikes us that the overwhelming 
majority of articles investigate factors influencing the performance of the franchise system as 
a whole, whereas the performance of individual franchised units has largely been neglected.   14 
We therefore want to stimulate franchising academics to investigate the decision to become a 
franchisee and the factors influencing the franchisee’s motivation to own several units, as 
well as performance issues related to individual franchise units. 
 
The lack of attention to the franchisee’s perspective becomes even more apparent with respect 
to  control  issues.  Free-riding  and  opportunistic  behaviour  are  not  only  important  control 
problems  for  franchisors,  but  also  for  franchisees.  Franchisors  can  display  opportunistic 
behaviour,  for instance,  by  encroachment  (see Kalnins (2004))  or  by  developing  national 
promotional campaigns for products but failing to ship appropriate quantities of the product to 
their  franchisees  (see  Dahlstrom  and  Nygaard  (1999)).  Thus,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  the 
franchisor  fails  to  provide  his  franchisees  with  the  necessary  and  promised  support. 
Furthermore, Combs et al. (2004) refer to the horizontal agency problems that may arise in a 
franchising  chain:  franchisees  have  the incentive  to lower quality  when  the  gains of this 
activity  can  be  internalized  and  the  costs  externalized.  This  free-riding  behaviour  by 
franchisees  will  not  only  damage  the  franchisor,  but  the  other  franchisees  as  well.  This 
problem is exacerbated by the mobility of customers. However, hardly any of the papers of 
this literature review thoroughly discussed the control mechanisms that franchisees can apply 
to monitor their franchisor and peer franchisees. Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) are the only 
researchers to investigate franchisor opportunism. They find that cooperative interaction curbs 
bargaining costs and that formalization reduces this opportunism. Their theoretical model 
frames  opportunism  as  a determinant  of  transaction  costs  and  implicates cooperation  and 
formalization as control structures that decrease franchisor opportunism. Despite their effort, 
we want to stress that franchisee control problems and mechanisms have not yet received the 
deserved attention in the literature and want to urge franchising researchers to deal with this 
topic more extensively in future research. We hereby encourage franchising researchers also 
to  incorporate  the  perspective  of  other  players  such  as  the  managers  of  company-owned 
outlets  or  master  franchisees.  Dant  (2008)  adds  that  the customer’s  perspective  has  been 
ignored in a similar way. 
   
It is clear that control problems of the franchisor and potential remedies appear – as the 
central or a more peripheral research topic – in almost every franchising paper. This is logical 
given the large number of players involved in the franchising chain, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Remarkably,  however,  all  articles  investigate  particular  control  problems  and/or  control 
mechanisms  in  isolation.  In  other  words,  the  extant  franchising  literature  is  lacking  a 
comprehensive  discussion of the  management  control  system  in  operation.  Moreover, the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship has been treated as a rather homogeneous phenomenon. In 
practice, however, the characteristics of franchisor-franchisee relationships vary in terms of   15 
aspects like the type of product/service, the degree of support offered by the franchisor, the 
personal  involvement  of  the  franchisee-investor  etc.  (see  Shane  (1998b),  Stanworth  and 
Curran (1999)). We therefore see a need for the in-depth investigation of the control problems 
under these varying circumstances and recommend a more holistic approach to tackle the 
control issues in the franchisor-franchisee relationship.  
 
We observe that agency theory is the dominant framework used to investigate control issues 
and we would like to call for more theoretical diversity. Agency theory informs us about the 
potential control problems in inter-firm franchising relations, but not about how these control 
problems may differ in various franchising relationships with different transaction, transaction 
environment  and  transaction  partner  characteristics.  More  specifically,  we  expect  that 
franchisor-franchisee  relationships  with  different  characteristics  are  experiencing  different 
control problems, which in turn require different control mechanisms. In future research, it 
might therefore be interesting to complement agency theory with transaction cost economics 
(TCE). TCE studies how trading firms protect themselves from the hazards associated with 
exchange relationships and attempts to explain how trading partners choose, from a set of 
governance alternatives, the arrangement that offers protection for their relationship-specific 
investments  at  the  lowest  cost  (see  Williamson  (1979)).  In  TCE-terms,  the  relationship 
between a franchisor and a franchisee can differ in a variety of ways such as the amount of 
asset specificity involved, the degree of uncertainty about the future and about other parties’ 
actions  and  the  complexity  of  the  arrangement  (see  Shelanski  and  Klein  (1995)).  This 
theoretical perspective has already been successfully applied in studies on the management 
control structure of other types of strategic alliances such as outsourcing relationships, joint 
ventures and buyer-supplier relationships (see Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000), 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003), Dekker (2003), Dekker (2004), Kamminga and Van der 
Meer-Kooistra  (2007)).  Some  papers  of  our  literature  selection  have  already  adopted  the 
TCE-perspective (see Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999), Leblebici and Shalley (1996), Michael 
(2000)), but not in the way we suggest.  
 
However,  TCE  has  often  been  criticized  as  it  is  insufficient  to  adequately  explain  the 
management  and  control  of  inter-organisational  relationships.  Because  of  its  focus  on 
opportunism and transaction cost minimization, TCE does not recognize the variety in the 
forms  and  goals  of  inter-organisational  relationships.  In  addition  to  economizing  on 
transaction costs  or the  management  of appropriation  concerns resulting  from  a  partner’s 
potential opportunistic behaviour, another goal of control of inter-organisational relationships 
is  the  coordination  of  interdependent  tasks  between  partners.  Moreover,  TCE’s  primarily 
contractual  view  of  governance  is  incomplete,  as  it  does  not  consider  organisational   16 
mechanisms of governance and informal or social control mechanisms. Therefore, to build a 
management control framework for different types of franchisor-franchisee relationships, we 
suggest  to not  exclusively  rely  on TCE,  but  to  also  incorporate elements  of organisation 
theory and the trust literature. The relationship between control and trust seems to be a rather 
complex one. Researchers have taken diverging positions with respect to this relationship in 
the management control literature on interfirm relationships. Examples of such positions are 
‘control structures are carriers of trust’, ‘control structures build trust’, ‘trust can replace the 
design and implementation of control structures and practices’ or ‘trust might be a necessary 
condition for control structures’ (see Van der Meer – Kooistra and Vosselman (2006)). It 
would be interesting to investigate the complex dynamics between trust and control in the 
franchising  context.  Organisation  theory  assumes  that  higher  degrees  of  interdependence 
increase  the  need  for  coordination  and  result  in  more  complex  administrative  forms  of 
organisation (see Thompson (1967)). In sum, appropriation concerns, as recognized by TCE, 
and coordination requirements, as recognized by organisation theory, are powerful concepts 
in explaining management control of inter-organisational relationships. These concepts jointly 
describe the partner firms’ need to manage the creation and to safeguard the appropriation of 
value  (see  Dekker  (2004)).  These  theories  therefore  provide  interesting  opportunities  to 
investigate the actual operation of management control systems in franchising relationships. 
To advance this track, we visualize our rationale in Figure 2. The analysis of the recent 
franchising literature enables us to identify some of the factors that influence the relationship 
between the franchisor and the franchisee. Figure 2 provides a summarizing overview of the 
factors  identified  in  the  literature  which  mediate  the  franchisor-franchisee  relationship.  It 
depicts these factors in TCE-terms, namely as transaction, transaction party and transaction 
environment  characteristics,  and  shows  that  these  are  expected  to  influence  the  control 
problems and, in turn, the control mechanisms that may arise in the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship. We encourage future research to refine this framework and to test the effect of 
the identified factors on control problems and control mechanisms in the franchising context.   
 
[insert Figure 2 here]   
 
Our  additional  suggestions  are  inspired  by  our  observations  of  the  approach  taken  when 
studying franchising issues. First of all, we notice that the overwhelming majority of the 
recent franchising research applies quantitative methods on archival or survey data (see Table 
1, 2 & 3). A qualitative approach seems far less popular. However, qualitative methods have 
their  virtue,  certainly  when  used  in combination  with  quantitative  methods.  For  instance, 
consider the conflicting predictions of theoretical perspectives such as those of the resource 
scarcity and the agency theories with regard to changes in the proportion of franchised and   17 
company-owned units (see Dant et al. (1996)). In this case, theory-building from case-study 
research  could  be  particularly  appropriate  because  it  enables  the  researcher  to  let  new 
elements come into the framework (see Eisenhardt (1989)). Similarly, Dant (2008) calls for 
more innovative research thrusts and encourages a more phenomenological approach to gain a 
better understanding of franchising topics. Secondly, almost all franchising research has taken 
place  in  the  U.S.  context.  In  line  with  Dant  (2008),  we  observe  the  need  to  investigate 
franchising  outside  the  North-American  setting  and  to  consider  other  sectors  than  the 
restaurant  industry.  Thirdly,  despite  the  fact  that  Kaufmann  and  Dant  (1998)  exhort 
franchising  researchers  to  investigate  the  implications  of  franchising  for  entrepreneurship 
research, only two papers have subsequently examined franchising from an entrepreneurship 
perspective  (see  Falbe  et  al.  (1998),  Clarkin  and  Rosa  (2005)).  Consequently,  future 
franchising  research  could  exploit  the  research  opportunities  that  an  entrepreneurship 
perspective has to offer. Fourth, extant franchising research has largely ignored the paper by 
Shane (1998a), who suggests researching non-linear relationships to advance the research on the 
plural form in franchising. Therefore, we advise researchers to explore this route as this may 
shed some light on the inconsistent findings that characterize research on the plural form up 




In this paper, we reviewed the recent management literature on franchising published in high-
impact journals during the period 1996 – 2008. In addition, we focus on the management 
control aspects of franchising chains. The final selection of eighty-six papers was classified 
along  three  broad  themes,  namely  the  initiation  and  subsequent  propensity  to  franchise, 
franchise performance and control of franchising relationships. Based on the analysis of the 
selected  literature,  we  advise  researchers  to  not  exclusively  take  into  consideration  the 
franchisor’s  perspective,  but  to  additionally  incorporate  other  parties’  perspectives  when  
examining  franchising phenomena. Concerning this issue, the franchisee’s perspective merits 
particular notice. In spite of the fact that several control problems and control mechanisms in 
franchising chains have already been examined in isolation, we conclude that the study of the 
actual management of franchising relations including management control systems has not yet 
received  the  academic  attention  it  actually  deserves.  Therefore,  we  propose  combining 
elements from the TCE, organisation theory and the trust literature in order to gain a profound 
understanding  of  the  management  control  systems  used  in  different  types  of  franchisor-
franchisee relationships. Other identified avenues for future research are the use of qualitative 
methods, studying the franchising phenomenon outside the U.S. context, investigating the   18 
implications  of  franchising  for  entrepreneurship  research  and  researching  non-linear 
relationships to advance research on the plural form. 
   19 
NOTES 
                                                 
i  The  management  control  system  of  a  company  is  a  means  of  gathering  and  using  information  to  aid  and 
coordinate  the  process  of  making  planning  and  control  decisions  throughout  the  organisation  and  to  direct 
employee behaviour. In order to attain these objectives, management has some control mechanisms at its disposal 
(see Horngren et al. (1999).    
 
ii  Web  of  Science  provides  powerful  access  to  the  world’s  leading  citation  databases,  with  authoritative, 
multidisciplinary coverage from nearly 9300 of the highest impact journals worldwide. 
 
iii We selected relevant articles from the following journals: Academy of Management Journal, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, British Journal of Management, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, International Business 
Review,  International  Small  Business  Journal,  Journal  of  Business  Venturing,  Journal  of  Corporate  Finance, 
Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Management, Journal of 
Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Small 
Business Management, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Management Science, Marketing Science, 
Organization Science, Small Business Economics, Strategic Management Journal, The Journal of Law, Economics 
& Organization, The RAND Journal of Economics. 
 
iv Area development franchising refers to the contractual obligation for the franchisee to open a certain number of 
outlets in a specified period of time. Sequential multi-unit franchising refers to the right of the franchisee to open 
additional outlets. This typically involves a separate franchise contract for each subsequent unit (Grünhagen and 
Mittelstaedt (2005)).   20 
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Figure 2: Framework of factors expected to influence control problems and control 
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Table 1 
Decision to franchise: Franchise initiation and subsequent propensity to franchise 
Paper  Theory  Method  Summary 
Panel A: General factors determining the extent of franchising 
Dant, Brush & 
Iniesta (1996) 
Gender-based theories  Survey (2592 franchisors, 5 industry 
sectors, North-America) 
Investigates the propensity of female franchisors to franchise. Finds evidence that the franchising 
route to business is not adequately exploited by women and that female franchisors tend to have 
smaller networks which may limit women's access to certain resources. 
Michael (1996)  Agency theory  Archival (18 industries, U.S.)  Develop a choice model that explains the share of sales of an industry through franchise systems. 
Business risk and human capital both negatively influence the share of sales through franchise 
systems. 
Stanworth & Curran 
(1999) 
Sociological theory  Theoretical paper  Offers  a  more  encompassing  theoretical  model  on  franchising  using  a  mainly  sociological 
approach,  equally  suited  to  quantitative  or qualitative  research  approaches.  The  model  offered 
takes the form of 15 general propositions spanning 3 levels: macro, organisational and individual. 
Alon (2001)  Agency theory, Resource 
scarcity theory 
Archival (361 firms, non-food 
retailing, U.S.) 
Examines  the  proportion  of  franchised  outlets  in  the  US  retailing  sector.  The  proportion  of 
franchised outlets is positively related to size (number of outlets) and geographical scope and 
negatively related to the rate of growth and the level of investment.  
Combs & Ketchen 
(2003) 
Agency theory, Resource 
scarcity theory 
Meta-analysis (44 studies)  Examines the factors that lead firms to offer franchises. The findings offer support for several of 
the  hypotheses  grounded  in  agency  theory  (geographic  dispersion,  local  managerial  expertise, 
franchisor inputs, outlet size), but not for those grounded in resource scarcity (firm age, system 
size, growth rate, capital scarcity). 
Tracey & Jarvis 
(2007) 
Agency theory, Resource 
scarcity theory 




Examines  the  relevance  of  agency  theory  and  resource  scarcity  theory  for  social  venture 
franchising.  Findings  include  that  the  costs  of  selection  are  higher  than  in  business  format 
franchising as franchisees are assessed on their ability to achieve social as well as commercial 
objectives and that the dual goals make goal alignment more complex and resource intensive than 
in business format franchising, leading to higher agency costs. 
Williams (1998)  Agency theory, Wealth 
maximization 
Archival (14550 single-owner firms 
of which 951 franchisees, 26 4-digit 
SIC industries, U.S.) 
Examines the entrepreneur's decision to enter into the franchise contract. Finds that entrepreneurs 
are more likely to franchise than to start an independent business, the greater the industry risk, the 
greater the financial capital available at start-up, the higher the education level, the more salaried 
work experience. Prior business owners are less likely to franchise.  
Kaufmann (1999)  -   Survey (63 participants of the 
Franchise Exposition, -, U.S.) 
Explores the decision to purchase a franchise within the broader context of the decision to become 
self-employed. The decision to purchase a franchise is positively related to the perceived benefits 
of  self-employment  and  the  importance  attached  to  the  financial  and  business  benefits  of 
franchising. Franchising offers a greater choice of sectors. 
Panel B: Multi-unit franchising 
Kaufmann & Dant 
(1996) 
Agency theory, Resource 
constraints theory 
Survey (152 franchisors, fast-food 
restaurant industry, U.S.) 
Investigates  the  reasons  to  enter  multi-unit  franchising.  The  use  of  multi-unit  franchising  is 
positively related to growth rates and it contributes to the firm's overall franchising strategy in 
explaining that growth.   30 
Kalnins & 
Lafontaine (2004) 
-  Archival  (all  new  units  opened  by 
seven  of  the  largest  nationally 
franchised  chains,  fast-food 
restaurant  industry,  Texas,  period 
1980 – 1995)  
Examines empirically the extent of multi-unit ownership in franchised chains and the way in which 
franchisors allocate the ownership of units among franchisees. Finds that franchisors frequently 
use multi-unit franchisees, allow their multi-unit franchisees to own units that are close to one 
another and share market boundaries in ways similar to what they do with their company-owned 
units  and  favour  franchisees  with  relevant  experience  in  markets  with  similar  demographic 
characteristics.  Within  chain  incentives  and  efficiency  issues  drive  the  ownership  allocation 
decisions in these chains. 
Grünhagen & 
Mittelstaedt (2005) 
-   Survey (192 franchisees, fast-food 
industry, Illinois) 
Examination of the motivations of franchisees to participate in multi-unit franchising. The study 
finds evidence that area development franchisees and sequential multi-unit franchisees are equally 
investment-oriented but that the sequential multi-unit operators are more likely to seek fulfilment 
of entrepreneurial goals (intrinsic motivational factors). 
Weaven & Frazer 
(2007) 
Resource constraints 
theory, Efficiency theory, 
Agency theory 
Interviews (23 franchisors, service 
and retail sectors, Australia) 
Explores  the  strategic  reasons  justifying  the  recent  emergence  of  multiple  unit  franchising 
arrangements  within  Australia  from  the  perspective  of  the  franchisor.  Franchisors  encourage 
franchisee subsystem development because of strategic, operational and performance advantages 
(agency cost minimization, system-wide uniformity, brand value, reward strategies, subsystem unit 
proximity, intra-system competition). 
Panel C: Plural forms 
Dant, Paswan & 
Kaufman (1996) 
Resource constraints theory  Meta-analysis of the existing 
literature on ownership redirection 
Execution of a meta-analysis of the existing studies of ownership redirection in order to bring 
some clarity in the inconsistent empirical conclusions. Concludes that the operationalization of 
ownership redirection appears to significantly influence the conclusions reached by the empirical 
studies on ownership redirection.  
Shane (1998a)  Agency theory  Archival (818-1111 franchisors, 
several industries, U.S., period 
1991-1994) 
Examination of franchisor characteristics on the ownership redirection hypothesis. Finds evidence 
that size, rate of growth and geographic dispersion have a curvilinear effect on the proportion of 
franchised units and that royalty rates and initial investment have a negative linear relationship. 
Combs & Ketchen 
(1999) 
Agency theory,  Resource 
scarcity theory 
Archival (91, restaurant industry, 
U.S., period 1989-1993) + expert 
panel 
Examination of the changes in ownership patterns of franchise systems as they mature. Findings 
indicate that foreign expansion, asset specificity and capital scarcity have a positive impact on the 
degree  of  franchised  units,  while  specific  knowledge  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  degree  of 
franchised units. 
Dant & Kaufmann 
(2003) 
Signalling theory, Resource 
acquisition theory   
 
Survey (152 franchisors, fast food 
restaurant industry, U.S.) 
Exploration of the phenomenon of plural forms in franchising. Results indicate that there is some 
evidence of a greater tendency to permanently convert existing franchised outlets to company-
owned outlets as fast food systems mature and gain greater access to resources. 
Castrogiovanni, 
Combs & Justis 
(2006a) 
Agency theory, Resource 
scarcity theory 
Archival (439 franchisors, several 
industries, U.S.) 
Examination  of  factors  influencing  changes  in  the  franchisors'  propensity  to  franchise.  Finds 
evidence  that  franchisors  increase  their  proportion  of  franchised  units  when  they  have  a 
multinational scope and over time. Franchisors with large outlets and who grew in size emphasize 
firm ownership. 
Castrogiovanni, 
Combs & Justis 
(2006b) 
Agency theory, Resource 
scarcity theory 
Archival (102 franchisors, several 
industries, U.S.) 
Examination of the effects of capital scarcity on firms' emphasis on growth through franchising 
versus company-ownership. The proportion franchised exhibits a cubic pattern as franchisors age: 
increasing rapidly at first, decreasing, and then increasing again. 
Windspenger & 
Dant (2006) 
Resource scarcity theory, 
Agency theory, TCE 
Survey (83 franchisors, several 
industries, Austria) 
Investigation  of  ownership  redirection  and  finds  that  it  will  result  from  an  increase  in  the 
contractibility  of  the  franchisee's  local  market  assets  (e.g.  local  market  information)  and  the   31 
resultant increase in the franchisor's bargaining power during the contract period.  
Bürkle & Posselt 
(2008) 
Resource scarcity Agency 
theory, Signalling theory 
Analytical   Examination of why franchising companies use a mixture of franchisee-owned and franchisor-
owned  units.  Finds  that  the  costs  of  risk  and  controlling  franchised  units  explain  the  varying 
fraction of franchisee-owned to total selling units. 
Dant, Perrigot & 
Cliquet (2008) 
Agency theory, Resource 
constraints theory, 
Signalling theory 
Archival (471 U.S. chains, 457 
French chains, 468 Brazilian chains, 
service and product & retail sector) 
Exploration of the phenomenon of plural forms in franchising across the United States, France and 
Brazil. Findings indicate that the proportion of company-owned units within the network increases 
in  the  U.S.  with  company  age  and decreases  with  average  total  required  investment  and  cash 
liquidity requirement; increases in Brazil with total network size and decreases with incidence of 
internationalization. For French model no statistically significant results.  




theory, Risk management 
theory, Resource-based 
theory 
Theoretical paper  Examines  the  capabilities  of  international  franchisors.  Concludes  that  international  franchising 
requires a specific set of capabilities and that the ability to develop such competencies shifts both 
forward and backward over time in a dynamic process. 
Shane (1996b)  Agency theory  Survey (815 franchisors, several 
industries, U.S.) 
Examination of which capabilities of franchisors encourage them to expand internationally. Finds 
that franchisors who seek foreign franchisees have developed a greater capability to bond against 
and to monitor potential franchisee opportunism than their domestic counterparts. 
Contractor & 
Kundu (1998) 
TCE, Strategic theory of 
organisational capability 
and knowledge, Agency 
theory 
Survey (720 firms with foreign 
operations, worldwide, hotel 
industry, ) 
Examines  what  determines  the  choice  of  organisational  mode  for  international  interfirm 
collaborations (fully-owned, equity joint venture, franchising, and management service contracts). 
Finds  that  both  host  country  environment  and  firm  strategy  influence  the  selection  of 
organisational mode. 
Erramilli, Agarwal 
& Dev (2002) 
Organisational capability 
perspective 
Survey (139 firms, worldwide, 
hotels belonging to the Global 
Hoteliers Club) 
Examines the choice between franchising and management-service contracts among service firms 
for organizing overseas activities. Finds that imperfectly imitable capabilities push firms towards 
internal modes and that the availability of a support infrastructure is critical to the type of mode 
chosen. 
Welsh, Alon & 
Falbe (2006) 
 -  Conceptual  Summarizes the main research that has been conducted so far on international retail franchising in 
emerging  markets  and  presents  a  conceptual  model  of  the  stakeholders  of  international  retail 
franchising. 
Dunning, Pak & 
Beldona (2007) 
Ownership, Allocation and 
Internalization (OLI) 
paradigm (see Dunning 
(2000)) 
Survey (72 franchisors, several 
industries, U.S. & U.K.) 
Examines the foreign ownership choices of international franchisors and tests why a certain group 
of  franchisors  would  like  to  own  foreign  outlets  instead  of  franchising  them.  Finds  that 
international franchisors that enter foreign markets via an equity mode tend to have an exploration 
approach (e.g. learning knowledge), while franchisors that enter via the franchising mode tend to 
have an exploitation intention (e.g. market-seeking).  
   32 
Table 2 
Franchise performance 
Paper  Theory  Method  Findings 
Panel A: Growth & survival 
Shane (1996a)  Agency theory  Archival  (138  franchisors,  several 
industries, U.S.) 
Investigates the implications of hybrid organisational arrangements for firm growth and 
survival.  Hybrid  organisational  forms  provide  a  way  to  overcome  moral  hazard  and 
adverse selection with respect to new managers and consequently overcome managerial 
limits to firm growth and lead to faster growth. Franchising as an expansion strategy has 
a positive effect on growth and survival. 
Bates (1998)  Agency theory  Archival  (52088  young 
establishments,  restaurant  industry, 
U.S., period 1986 – 1987) 
Examines  the  survival  patterns  among  franchise  and  non-franchise  small  firms  and 
establishments that entered business during 1986 and 1987. Purchase of a franchise is 
unlikely to reduce the risks facing a new business start-up because of the many newly-
opened units in mature franchising niches owned by multi-unit franchisees having greater 
experience and resources. The risk of new  franchisees is larger than the risk of new 
independent entrepreneurs, while the risk of new independent entrepreneurs is larger than 
the risk of multi-unit franchisees who open a new unit.  
Falbe  &  Welsh 
(1998) 
Cross-cultural theory (see Hofstede  
(1980));  Resource  scarcity  theory, 
Agency  theory,  Risk  spreading 
theory, Life cycle theory 
Survey  (-  franchisors,  several 
industries, Canada, Mexico & U.S.) 
Analyzes  franchise  executives'  perceptions  of  the  importance  of  a  number  of 
characteristics  associated  with  franchisee  success  and  failure.  Finds  significant 
differences  in  the  perceptions  of  most  of  the  factors  of  success  and  failure  (system 
quality,  brand  name,  local  environment,  communication,  franchisor  activities,  and 
franchisee activities) among franchisor executives based on country location and based 
on franchise strategy (= % of franchisee-owned units).  
Lafontaine & Shaw 
(1998) 
-  Archival  (4000  franchisors,  several 
industries, U.S., period 1980-1992) 
Examines issues of growth, entry and exit into franchising by franchisors in business 
format  franchising.  Finds  that  the  number  of  business-format  franchisors  is  highly 
correlated with the number of units in these chains and that business-format franchising 
growth is at best commensurate with the growth rate of the economy as a whole. 
Shane (1998b)  Agency  theory,  Resource 
constraints theory 
Archival (157 new franchisors, several 
industries, U.S.) 
Investigates  whether  new  franchise  systems  are  more  likely  to  survive  if  they  are 
structured  to  economize  on  agency  costs.  Finds  that  franchise  systems  which  are 
structured to economize on agency costs are more likely to survive. Passive ownership, 
franchisee  cash  investment,  franchisee  experience  and  geographic  concentration  have 
negative  effects  on  system  failure,  while  the  complexity  of  the  franchise  system  and 
master  franchising  have  positive  effects.  Rejects  the  resource  constraints  theory 
prediction.  
Shane  &  Foo 
(1999) 
Economic  theory,  Institutional 
theory 
Archival  (1292  business  format 
franchisors  established  between  1979 
and 1996, several industries, U.S.) 
Explores whether institutional theory adds to economic explanations of the survival of 
new franchise systems. The results show that new franchise systems are more likely to 
survive  if  they  both  gain  legitimacy  as  well  as  efficiency:  sociological  explanations 
enhance economic explanations for the survival of new franchise systems. 
Azoulay  &  Shane  Evolutionary theory  Analysis  of  170  new  franchise  Demonstrates that firms are selected for survival on the basis of contracting efficiency in   33 
(2001)  contracts & interviews (16 founders of 
new  business  format  franchise 
systems, several industries, U.S.) 
the franchising context. New franchise chains that adopt exclusive territories are more 
likely to survive over time than chains that do not. Successful and failed entrepreneurs 
possess different information about how to design contracts: those whose 'contractual 
experiments' prove to be more consistent with economic theory are rewarded for their 
superior information with survival. 
Shane (2001)  Efficient contracting theory  Archival  (2997  business  format 
franchisors,  several  industries,  U.S., 
period 1984 – 1996) 
Examines the effect of incentive contracting on the survival of business format franchise 
systems. Finds that large firms that adopt policies which screen agents, signal quality and 
control agent's free-riding are more likely to survive than large firms which do not adopt 
these  policies.  Changes  in  contracting  hazards  resulting  from  changes  in  system  size 
determine the necessary changes in franchisor policies to ensure firm survival. 
Castrogiovanni  & 
Justis (2002) 
Resource  scarcity  theory,  Agency 
theory 
Archival  (246  franchisors,  several 
industries, U.S., period 1991 – 1998) 
Identifies factors associated with network growth of franchisors. Finds that both strategy 
and context exert influences on growth, though strategic influences may be greater than 
contextual ones. Growth orientation and start-up costs are found to have positive effects, 
while industry growth and age are found to have negative effects on network growth.  
Grünhagen & 
Dorsch (2003) 
Attitude theory   Survey (206, fast-food industry, U.S.)  Examines whether franchisee perceptions of franchisor value change over time. Finds 
that franchisees had the strongest positive perceptions when asked to recall an earlier 
decision to expand their franchise operations. These opinions weakened when franchisees 
contemplating expansion of their operations were asked for their current and anticipated 
future opinions of franchisor value.  
Kalnins  &  Mayer 
(2004) 
-  Archival (2474 units, pizza restaurant 
industry, Texas) 
Investigates  the  importance  of  local  and  distant  congenital  (=  the  experience  of  the 
franchisor and the owner at the time of the unit's founding) experience for unit survival. 
Finds  that  the  retail  and  service  units  of  multiunit  owners,  whether  affiliated  with 
franchisors or not, benefited from their owner's local congenital experience and that units 
did  not  benefit  from  distantly  gained  experience.  Local  experience  of  other  owners 
affiliated  with  the  same  franchisor  reduced  failure  rates  of  units.  Franchisors'  distant 
experience  did  not  prove  beneficial.  Among  units  affiliated  with  franchisors,  a 
complementary effect was found for owner and franchisor congenital experience. 
Stanworth  et  al. 
(2004) 
Resource-based perspective  Interviews  (8  franchisors,  several 
industries, U.K.) 
Develops a resource-based view of organisational development by identifying the key 
importance of human and intellectual capital in franchising. Recognizes the advantage of 
multi-partner franchise system start-ups, the benefits of franchise system piloting and the 
advantage of prior experience of franchising. 
Shane,  Shankar  & 
Aravindakshan 
(2006) 
Signaling  theory,  Resource 
constraints  theory,  Resource-
acquisition theory 
Archival  (1292  business  format 
franchise  systems,  152  industries, 
U.S., period 1979 – 1996) 
Examines  the  use  of  strategic  actions  (pricing  policy,  strategic  control  decisions)  of 
franchisors  to  attract  partners  and  increase  system  size.  Franchisors  that  grow  larger 
lower their royalty rates as the systems age,  have low up-front franchise fees that rise 
over time, own a small proportion of outlets and lower that percentage over time, keep 
franchisees' initial investment low and finance their franchisees. 
Szulanski & Jensen 
(2006) 
Theory of presumptive adaptation  Repeated-treatment  quasi-experiment, 
archival,  interviews  and  qualitative 
data  (case  of  a  postal  services  firm, 
Israel,  period  August  1995 until  July 
Investigates how adherence to recommended practices affects the rate of network growth 
in  the  host  country.  Finds  that presumptive  adaptation  (=adaptation  that  removes  the 
diagnostic value of the original practice) stalls network growth, while close adherence to 
the original practice results in remarkably rapid network growth.   34 
2001) 
Panel B: Learning & entrepreneurship 
Ingram  &  Baum 
(1997) 
Learning theory, Theory of strategy  Archival (1135 chains, hotel industry, 
U.S., period 1896 – 1985)  
Investigates the influence of own experience and of two types of industry experience) on 
the failure rates of US hotel chains and briefly analyzes the effect of franchisors on the 
learning of hotel chains. Finds that franchisors are superior learners and that franchisees 
did  not  enjoy  a  benefit  from  their  experience  with  franchised  units.  Franchisors 
represented a radical change for the hotel chain industry.  
Falbe, Dandridge 
& Kumar (1998) 
 -  Archival & survey + interview data 
(50 franchisees, 8 different industries, 
U.S.) 
Examines the influences of the organisational context of the franchisor (size, age, growth 
rate, and time in franchising) on the entrepreneurial strategies of franchisors, their 
innovation efforts, and franchisor support of entrepreneurial activities by franchisees as 
observed by their franchisees. 
Kaufmann & Dant 
(1998) 
Personal traits, processes and 
activities perspective,  Resource 
constraints theory, Agency theory 
Theoretical paper  Explores the relationship between franchising and entrepreneurship in general and their 
research domains in particular. Investigates the franchisor’s role in creating an innovative 
concept, the franchisee’s role in bringing the franchisor’s concept to new markets, the 
franchisee’s acceptance of risk, and the special issues surrounding the use of multi-unit 
franchising.  They  conclude  that  franchising  provides  a  unique  and  fertile  setting  for 
research in entrepreneurship. 
Sorenson & 
Sørensen (2001) 
Learning theory  Archival  (152  chains,  restaurant 
industry, period 1992-1998) 
  
Investigates whether the mix of company-owned and franchised units affects the balance 
between standardization and adaptation and thereby influences chain performance. Finds 
that  managers  of  company-owned  outlets  exploit  more  and  entrepreneurs  managing 
franchises explore more. Company-owned and franchised units complement each other 
because of the different types of organisational learning. 
Clarkin & Rosa 
(2005) 
Entrepreneurial teams  In-depth interviews & archival (1201 
franchises, several industries, North 
America)  
Investigates entrepreneurial teamwork and finds that creativity and adaptation are not 
always confined to the franchisors, but that cooperative and adaptable relationships allow 
room for entrepreneurial activity by franchisees. Restrictive systems are likely to perform 
less well. 
Panel C: Fit with strategy and effect on performance 
Baucus,  Baucus  & 
Human (1996) 
Theory  of  strategic  management, 
Theory of entrepreneurship 
Survey  (162  franchisees,  fast-food 
restaurant industry, U.S.) 
Analyze how consensus between franchisors and franchisees on the indicators of means 
and ends of competition relates to competitive advantage and performance. The authors 
believe dissension on competitive methods arises as franchisees initially move from a 
knowledge disadvantage relative to franchisors to a knowledge advantage associated with 
the  accumulation  of  local  experience.  Consensus  on  means  for  product  and  brand 
development  relates  positively  to  the  franchise  system's  competitive  advantage  and 
consensus  on  the  means  of  pursuing  efficiency  exhibits  a  positive  relationship  with 
business performance and franchisees' satisfaction. 
Litz & Stewart 
(1998) 
-  Survey  (307  stores,  retail  hardware 
industry, U.S.) 
Compares the relative competitive position of two common organisational forms, namely 
the trade-name franchise and the independent retailer. Finds that franchisees compete 
against  a  large  entrant  by  increasing  product  diversity,  but  decreasing  product 
complexity,  service  diversity  and  service  complexity.  Independents  tend  to  reduce   35 
product diversity and increase service diversity and service complexity. 
Michael (1999a)  -  Archival  (30  franchisors,  restaurant 
industry, U.S.) 
Examines  the  effectiveness  of  franchising  as  an  instrument  for  differentiation  for the 
franchisee.  On  balance,  the  results  support  the  theory  that  at  least  in  the  restaurant 
industry franchising is providing product differentiation to entrepreneur-franchisees. 
Achrol & Etzel 
(2003) 
Marketing  channel  theory, 
Contingency theory 
Survey  (439  single-unit  franchisees, 
several industries, -) 
Studies the strategic goals of reseller firms in franchise channels and how these goals are 
related to performance. Finds that in growth markets productivity goals are important for 
performance;  in  mature  markets  adaptation  goals  are  important;  in  rich  environments 
adaptation goals are important; in lean environments productivity goals are important; in 
stable  environments  productivity  goals  are  important;  in  dynamic  markets  adaptation 
goals are important. 
Hoffman  &  Preble 
(2003) 
Theory of competitive advantage  Survey  (72  franchisors,  8  industry 
sectors, North-America) 
Offers  an  in-depth  treatment  of  conversion  franchising  and the  effect  on  competitive 
advantage. Finds that a franchisor is more inclined to use conversion franchising when he 
has  increased  levels  of  experience,  when  conversion  franchising  offers  economic 
resources and to a lesser extent, when it offers skills and knowledge. Resources and skills 
serve as sources of competitive advantage.  
Michael (2003)  Agency theory, Resource scarcity 
theory 
Archival (100 franchisors, restaurant 
industry, U.S.) 
Investigation of whether first mover advantages exist in the restaurant industry.  Evidence 
found of the existence of a first mover advantage through pre-emption of valuable real 
estate and desirable mind space of customers, which supports the idea of franchising as a 
method of resource acquisition.  
Combs, Ketchen & 
Hoover (2004) 
Agency  theory,  Resource 
constraints theory, Strategic groups 
approach (see Porter (1980)) 
Archival  (65  chains,  restaurant 
industry, U.S., period 1991 - 1995) 
Development  of  the  idea  that  strategic  groups  exist  among  franchisors  and  that 
performance differs among these groups. 3 strategic groups are found, namely agency 
franchisors, agency franchise minimizers and resource scarce franchisors. The strategic 
group most influenced to franchise out of resource scarcity exhibited poorer performance 
than the other two groups. 
Yin  &  Zajac 
(2004) 
Contingency theory  Archival  &  qualitative  (6000  units 
from  1  chain,  pizza  restaurant 
industry, U.S., period 1991-1997) 
Investigates whether performance differences between franchised and company-owned 
units are attributable to the matching of one structure with a corresponding appropriate 
strategy. Finds that franchised stores with their more flexible and decentralized structures 
are more likely to pursue strategies that emphasize flexibility and local adaptation and 
that company-owned stores tend to emphasize predictability and control. The strategy-
structure fit leads to better performance. 
Srinivasan (2006)  Contingency theory  Archival  (55  chains,  restaurant 
industry, period 1992 – 2002) 
Examines the relationship between a firm's dual distribution strategy and its intangible 
firm  value.  The  results  support  a  four-segment  model:  dual  distribution  increases 
intangible  value  for  some  firms,  but  decreases  intangible  value  for  others,  both 
independently and in conjunction with other firm characteristics (age, scope of vertical 
integration, advertising, financial leverage and financial liquidity). 
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 Table 3 
Control problems and control mechanisms 
Paper  Theory  Method  Findings 
Panel A: Control problems: Control versus autonomy 




theory, Transaction cost 
economics, Conflict theory 
Theoretical paper  Develops a theoretical explanation of the relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee and the nature of conflict in the relationship from the perspective of different 
theories. Recognizes that franchising is an inter-organisational form and synthesizes the 
structure,  rationale,  governance  and  strength  of  the  relationship  through  theoretical 
linkages and the conflict literature.  
Bradach (1997)  Contingency theory  Ethnographic field study (5 chains, restaurant 
industry, U.S.) 
Models how chains use a plural form to maintain uniformity and achieve system-wide 
adaptation  to  changing  markets.  Finds  that  organisational  structure,  control  systems, 
career  paths  and  strategy-making  processes  are  four  means  through  which  the 
combination of company and franchised units help chains achieve their objectives. 
Kaufmann & 
Eroglu (1998) 
-  Theoretical paper  Examines  the  tension  between  standardization  and  local  adaptation  by  incorporating 
consumer  behaviour  and  globalization  research  into  the  analysis  of  domestic  format 
franchising.  Concludes  that  finding  the  balance  between  standardization  of  the  core 
elements and permitted local market adaptation of the peripheral elements remains one 
of the greatest challenges facing franchisors.  
Pizanti & Lerner 
(2003) 
Agency theory, Exchange 
theory 
Interviews & archival (3 chains, fast-food 
industry, Israel) 
Describes  the  control  and  autonomy  paradox  in  franchising.  The  findings  indicate 
different forms of integration of control and autonomy in the three chains (two global 
chains, 1 domestic chain): conceptualizing control and autonomy as multidimensional 
concepts  enables  a  focus  on  the  integration  of  control  and  autonomy  (complements 
rather than a paradox between them). 
Paik & Choi (2007)  Agency theory, Marketing 
channels theory, Resource 
dependence theory 
Interviews (42 franchisor & franchisees, fast-
food industry, U.S. & Europe) 
Examines  the  similarities  and  differences  between  domestic  and  international 
franchisees in the amount of control exerted by their U.S. franchisors and the degree of 
autonomy accorded to the franchisees. Finds that international franchisees have more 
autonomy  and  that  experienced  international  franchisees  are  less  likely  to  demand 
autonomy, while experienced U.S. franchisees seek more autonomy. U.S. franchisors 
and international franchisees that experience difficulties tend to seek collaboration rather 
than compete for control or autonomy. 





Survey (179 retailers, 23 area sales managers, 
oil refinement industry, Norway)  
Examines  opportunistic  behaviour  by  the  franchisor.  The  theoretical  model  frames 
opportunism as a factor that increases transaction costs in inter-organisational exchange. 
The authors find that franchisee’s efforts to constrain ex-post transaction costs in inter-
organisational exchange by cooperative interaction and formalization can function as 
control structures that alleviate opportunism.  
Kalnins (2004)  -  Archival (range 334 – 782 units, hotel industry, 
U.S., period 1990-1999) 
Examines the phenomenon of encroachment (= when franchisors add new units of their 
brands proximately to their franchisees' existing units). Finds that encroaching behaviour 
is caused by incentives that result from the governance form of franchising and is not   37 
simply an outcome that accompanies all expansion. 
Kidwell, Nygaard 
& Silkoset (2007) 
Agency theory, Exchange 
theory, Marketing 
channels theory 
Survey (192 franchise dealers, gasoline 
distribution industry, Norway) 
Investigates  contextual  antecedents  of  free-riding  by  franchisees  on  franchisor  brand 
reputation and effects of free-riding on performance in an MNE’s franchising network. 
Finds that structural elements (increased formalization, decentralized decision-making), 
interactions  between  franchisor  representatives  and  franchisee  dealers  and  market-
related factors (external competition) are associated with lower levels of franchisee free-
riding. 
Panel C: Control problems:  Marketing mix 
Lafontaine (1999)  -  Survey (franchisees from 36 chains, restaurant 
industry, U.S.)  
Assesses the effect of franchising on price dispersion within chains in fairly narrowly 
defined geographical areas. Finds that franchisors do not aim for fully uniform prices, 
even on the corporate side of their chains, the degree of price dispersion is highest for 
firms with both franchised and company-owned outlets, and price dispersion for fully 
franchised chains is greater than for fully corporate chains. 
Michael (1999b)  Agency theory  Archival (35 chains, restaurant industry, U.S.) 
(38 chains, hotel industry, U.S.) 
Analyzes  empirically  advertising  levels  based  upon  the  extent  of  franchising  in 
restaurant  chains  and  hotel  chains.  Finds  that  advertising  falls  with  the  level  of 
franchising  in  both  industries,  controlling  for  size  of  chain,  geographic  dispersion, 
market segment, sale of alcohol, resource availability and quality. 
Michael (2002)  Agency theory, Resource 
scarcity theory  
Archival (35 chains, restaurant industry, U.S.)  Investigates whether franchise chains, as hybrid forms, can coordinate the elements of 
the marketing mix. Finds that franchise chains appear to be unable to coordinate the 
elements of the marketing mix, compared with corporate chains.  
Panel D: Formal control: Contracts and formalization 





Archival (30 contracts, several industries, U.S.)  Examines  whether  contract  content  influences  both  the  expansion  of  the  franchise 
operations through new franchises and the amount of dispute between the two sides of 
the franchise contracts. The more relational a contract becomes, the more likely that it 
would  include  various  dispute  resolution  mechanisms.  The  commencement  and 
termination  aspect  should be  as  discrete  as  possible  and  the  operations  and  conduct 
provisions of the contract should be in relational terms to give the parties the ability to 
respond to changes in business conditions without renegotiating the contract. 
Desai (1997)  -  Theoretical paper  Studies the role of the advertising fee in improving channel coordination by solving a 
mathematical model under different assumptions. Finds that in the simple case with one 
franchisor  and  two  identical  franchisees,  the  advertising  fee  allows  the  franchisor  to 
commit to a specific level of advertising spending at the time of contract acceptance; the 
lump sum advertising fee is better than the sales-based advertising fee. In the case of one 
franchisor and two franchisees whose markets differ in terms of advertising's impact on 
sales, the sales-based advertising fee is preferred. In the case of the franchisor offering to 
contribute a matching fraction of the advertising fee to the advertising fund, the sales-
based advertising fee is preferred.  
Nault (1997)  Agency theory  Theoretical paper  Illustrates how information technology (ownership of customers) can enable a new form 
of the horizontal networked organisation through the provision of appropriate incentives   38 
to key actors within franchise arrangements. The underlying problem is that individual 
franchisees under-invest, because they do not account for the benefits accruing to other 
franchisees from their investment. A possible solution for this problem is the system of 
ownership  of  customers,  which  is  a  combination  of  identifying  individual  customers 
with  individual  franchises,  monitoring  customer  transactions  across  franchisees,  and 
transferring benefits between franchisees based on those transactions. 
Brickley (1999)  Agency theory  Archival (367 chains, several industries, U.S.)  Develops testable implications about three provisions commonly observed in franchise 
contracts  (restrictions  on passive  ownership,  area development  plans,  and  mandatory 
advertising expenditures). These provisions are most likely when there are significant 
externalities among the units within the franchise system - these incentive instruments 
are complements. 




Archival (1000 franchisors, several industries, 
U.S., period 1980-1992) 
Provides evidence on how franchisors adjust the key monetary terms of their contracts, 
namely  their  royalty  rates  and  franchise  fees,  as  they  gain  franchising  experience. 
Franchisors that do change their fees do not systematically increase or decrease their 
royalty rates as they become better established: variation in royalty rates and franchise 
fees is almost exclusively explained by across-firm differences. There is little apparent 
trade-off between royalty rates and up-front franchise fees. 
Brickley (2002)  Agency theory  Archival (711 chain, several trade & service 
industries, U.S.) 
Provides evidence on the determinants of royalties and upfront fees in share contracts by 
examining how state franchise termination laws affect franchise contracts. Finds that the 
two-sided  moral  hazard  model  explains  the  terms  in  franchise  contracts  and  that 
termination  laws  increase  the  relative  importance  of  franchisor  effort.  Overall, 
franchisees appear to pay a higher price for franchises in states with protection laws. 
Dnes (2003)  Transaction Cost 
Economics  
Theoretical model & Interviews (franchisor and 
3 franchisees on average from 57 chains, 
several industries, U.K.) 
Examines the nature of hostages in long-term contracts. A hostage is placed to assure a 
trading partner that a contracting party will not cheat. Finds that franchising contracts are 
a good illustration of the systematic development of mini hostages that are matched to 
particular forms of contractual discipline. 
Brickley, Misra & 
Van Horn (2006) 
Naïve franchisee theory, 
Standard economic theory 
Archival (1888 franchisors, several industries, 
U.S.) 
Examines  effects  on  contract  duration  of  franchising  contracts.  Finds  that  contract 
duration is positively and significantly related to the franchisee's physical and human 
capital investments. Larger,  more experienced franchisors offer  longer-term contracts 
than do newer franchisors. Firms seem to learn in designing optimal contract terms. 
Cochet & Garg 
(2008) 
Learning theory  Archival (contract provisions of 3 chains, 
restaurant, food and retailing industries, 
Germany, range 8-18 years) & interviews 
(representatives of 3 chains, restaurant, food 
and retailing industries, Germany)  
Explores  the  evolution  of  formal  contracts.  Finds  that  franchisors  remain  bounded 
rational:  learning  explains  contract  design  capability  better  than  foresight,  a  new 
management and the pursuit of uniformity lead to contract changes and the presence of 
an active franchisee council promotes the efficiency of the contract change process. 
 
Panel E: Formal control: Structure 
Wu (1998)  Agency theory  Archival (155 units (90 franchised, 65 
independent), motel industry, U.S.) 
Starts from the idea that a franchising structure provides a solution to problems between 
trademark  manufacturers  and  its  dealers.  Analyzes  the  price  differential  between 
franchised and independent motels and examines how the initial franchise fee and the 
presence of repeat customers are related to the price a franchised firm charges for his   39 
brand name product. Finds that high fee franchises charged more than both independent 
motels and low fee franchises, motels (franchised or not) serving primarily non-repeat 
customers  charged  less  than  motels  that  served  repeat  customers  and  that  low  fee 
franchises in both repeat and non-repeat environments charged about the same price as 
independent motels. 
Lafontaine & Shaw 
(2005) 
Agency, Signaling & 
Resource scarcity theory 
Archival (4842 franchisors (19162 franchisor-
year observations), several industries, U.S. & 
Canada, period 1980-1997)  
Investigates how the targeted rate of company-ownership varies across firms. Finds that 
franchisors with high brand name value have high rates of company ownership: they 
have incentives to exert more control and by owning their outlets they can better protect 
their brands from franchisee free-riding.  
Panel F: Informal control 
Phan, Butler & Lee 
(1996) 
Agency theory, Strategic 
perspective 
Survey (160 franchisees of 2 franchisors, heavy 
truck industry, U.S.) + Interviews (senior 
executives from 1 chain & 7 franchisees of 4 
chains, heavy truck industry, U.S.) 
Develops a theoretical framework for understanding the informal interaction dynamics 
between franchisors and franchisees. As it is impossible for franchisors to specify all 
future actions in contractual terms, they compensate this by continually attempting to 
influence  their  franchisees  by  suasion.  Finds  that  franchisees  prefer  profit-oriented 
strategies and that franchisors prefer sales-oriented strategies and that either one of the 
two  goals  is  emphasized  instead  of  being  congruent.  In  the  long-term,  franchisors 
attempt to modify franchise contracts to implement sales-gain strategies. 
Dant & Nasr (1998)  Agency theory  Interviews (case of Lebanon) & survey (20 
U.S. based franchisors with franchisees in the 
Middle East and Africa, several industries , 
U.S., Middle East, Africa) 
Investigates  the  issue  of  control  and  control  techniques  employed  by  franchisors  to 
monitor the performance of their franchisees in distant markets with special focus on the 
role of information exchange. Finds that the extent of competition faced by franchisees 
is an incentive to provide information to franchisors and that the age of the relationship 
is a disincentive to sharing information with the franchisors. 
Jambulingam & 
Nevin (1999) 
Agency theory  Survey (154 franchisees, several industries, 
U.S.) 
Examines the relationship between key franchisee selection criteria and key measures of 
outcomes desired by franchisors. Finds that certain franchisee attitudes towards business 
can be used as an effective input control strategy by franchisors, because they explain a 
substantial portion of the variance in franchisees' outcomes desired by franchisors. 
Michael (2000)  Transaction cost 
economics, Agency 
theory, Life cycle theory, 
Porer’s five forces  
Archival (99 franchisors, restaurant industry, 
U.S.) 
Examines which factors can lead to a greater bargaining power of the franchisor. Finds 
that  dual  distribution,  selecting  inexperienced  franchisees,  the  granting  of  exclusive 
territories and employing a long training program increase the franchisor's bargaining 
power and the franchisee's compliance with franchisor standards and decrease litigation. 
Ullrich, Wieseke, 
Christ, Schulze &  
van Dick (2007) 
Social identity approach, 
Identity-matching 
principle 
Survey (101 managers and 281 employees from 
1 franchise system, travel agency industry, 
Germany) 
Examines corporate and organisational identification in franchisee organisations. Finds 
that organisational identification predicted customer-oriented behaviour on the level of 
the  local  organisation,  whereas  corporate  identification  predicted  attitude  toward 
corporate  citizenship  behaviour.  These  relationships  were  enhanced  in  organisations 
where managers displayed the respective behaviour themselves to a greater extent. 
Cochet, Dormann 
& Ehrmann (2008) 
Agency theory  Survey (208 franchisees from 11 chains, 
several industries, Germany) 
Tests the argument that chains counterbalance the loss in control inherent to autonomy 
with  relational  governance  mechanisms.  Finds  that  the  more  relational  governance 
becomes important, the weaker agents' incentives are aligned with the interests of the 
entire  network.    Multi-unit  ownership  and  franchisee  success  attenuated,  and 
competition exacerbated the need for relational control, while age of the relationship and   40 
geographic distance did not emerge as significant moderator variables.   41 
Table 4: Summary of factors influencing franchise initiation, performance and control from the perspective of the franchisor and the franchisee 
 
  Franchisor  Franchisee 
Factors influencing the 
decision to franchise 
￿  Business risk (-) 
￿  Human capital (-) 
￿  Firm growth rate (-) 
￿  Investment level (-) 
￿  Outlet size (+) 
￿  System size (+) 
￿  Geographical scope (+) 
￿  Local managerial expertise (+) 
￿  Franchisor inputs (+) 
￿  Industry risk (+) 
￿  Financial capital available at start-up (+) 
￿  Education level (+) 
￿  Salaried work experience (+) 
￿  Perceived benefits of self-employment (+) 
￿  Importance of financial and business benefits of franchising (+) 
￿  Choice of sectors (+) 
￿  Prior experience as a business owner (-) 
Factors influencing the 
decision to enter into 
multi-unit franchising 
￿  System growth rate (+) 
￿  Agency cost minimization (+) 
￿  System-wide uniformity (+) 
￿  Brand value (+) 
￿  System reward strategies of granting additional units (+) 
￿  Subsystem unit proximity (+) 
￿  Intra-system competition (-) 
￿  Incentives and efficiency issues 
￿  Goals  of  multi-unit  franchisee  type  (area  developers  and  versus 
sequential multi-unit operators)  
Factors influencing the 
proportion of franchised 
units as compared to  
company-owned units 
 
￿  Franchisor size (-) 
￿  Royalty rates (-) 
￿  Access to resources (-) 
￿  Specific knowledge of the firm (-) 
￿  Contractibility of local assets (-) 
￿  Incidence of internationalization (+) 
￿  Cash liquidity requirements imposed on franchisees (+)  
￿  Capital scarcity (+) 
￿  Asset specificity (+) 
￿  Level of initial investment (+/-) 
￿  Age (+/-) 
￿  System size (-/curvilinear) 
￿  System rate of growth (curvilinear) 







Factors influencing the 




￿  Host country environment 
￿  Firm strategy 
￿  Availability of a support infrastructure  
￿  Possibility to imitate capabilities (+)  
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Factors influencing 
franchise system growth  
￿  Franchisor growth orientation (+) 
￿  Multi-partner franchise system start-ups (+) 
￿  Franchise system piloting (+) 
￿  Franchisor prior franchising experience (+)  
￿  Lowering of royalty rates as the system ages (+) 
￿  Low up-front franchise fees rising over time (+) 
￿  Low initial investment (+) 
￿  Close adherence to the original franchise practice (+) 
￿  Industry growth (-) 
￿  Franchisor age (-) 
￿  Franchisee start-up costs (+) 
￿  Financing of the franchisees’ purchases of outlets by the franchisor 
(+) 
￿  Adaptation  by  the  subsidiary  that  removes  the  characteristic  or 
diagnostic value of the original franchising practice (-) 
￿  Positive franchisee perceptions about their franchisor’s value (+) 
 
Factors influencing 
survival and failure of 
the franchise system as a 
whole 
￿  Geographic concentration of the system (+) 
￿  Legitimacy of the system  (+) 
￿  Efficiency of the system (+) 
￿  Contracting efficiency  (+) 
￿  Adoption of exclusive territories (+) 
￿  Policies to screen agents (+) 
￿  Complexity of the franchise system (-) 
￿  Master franchising (-)  
￿  Passive ownership by the franchisee (+) 
￿  Franchisee cash investment (+) 
￿  Franchisee experience (+) 
Factors influencing 
survival and failure of 
business units 




each of the parties 
￿  Firm size 
￿  Firm age 
￿  Firm growth 
￿  Time  between  the  establishment  of  the  company  and  the 
establishment of a franchising system 
￿  Cooperative and adaptable relationships between franchisors (+) 





Factors on the strategy-
performance fit 
￿  Performance effects of franchisor’s strategy (aspects studied: 
conversion  franchising  strategy,  first-mover  advantage, 
resource scarcity and dual distribution strategy) 
 
￿  Link  between  franchisees’  strategies  and  performance  (aspects 
studied:  small  businesses’  strategy,  product  differentiation, 
strategy-structure fit) 
Control problems caused 
by the other party 
￿  Tension  between  control  and  autonomy  (aspects  studied: 
franchised units vs. company-owned units and domestic 
versus international franchisees) 
￿  Coordination  of  the  marketing  mix  (especially  w.r.t.  price 
dispersion within a chain and levels of advertising) 
￿  Free-riding  and  opportunistic  behaviour  by  the  franchisee 
(especially w.r.t. brand reputation) 






used to control the other 
￿  Contract  and  formalization  (aspects  studied:  dispute 
resolution clauses, advertising fees, restrictions on passive 
￿  Cooperative interaction and formalization   43 
  party  ownership, area development plans, royalty rates, initial 
franchising fees, contract duration, influence of experience 
on  design  of  optimal  contracts  and  information 
technology) 
￿  Dual distribution (with higher levels of company-ownership 
for higher levels of control)  
￿  Multi-unit  franchising  (to  increase  chain  uniformity  and  to 
decrease agency costs)  
￿  Informal  control  mechanisms  (aspects  studied:  informal 
dynamics between the franchisor and the franchisee, the 
franchisee’s  willingness  to  provide  information,  the 
franchisee’s  attitude  towards  business,  the  franchisee’s 
identification and the franchisor’s bargaining power) 
 
 
 
 
 